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THE TROUBLESOME RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF
RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY
Andrew Koppelman *
The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that neither it nor any
other branch of the state can decide matters that relate to the inter-
pretation of religious practice or belief. The state may not attempt to
determine the "truth or falsity" of religious claims,' courts may not try
to resolve "controversies over religious doctrine and practice,"2 may
not undertake "interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to the religion,"' 3 may make "'no
inquiry into religious doctrine,"' 4 and may give "no consideration of
doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the ten-
ets of faith."'5
This has meant most concretely that, for cases involving disputes
within religious organizations, the Court has had to craft special rules,
distinct from those governing other controversies. At English com-
mon law, if issues of religious doctrine arose in disputes over contract
obligations, tort claims, criminal fraud charges, or the administration
© 2009 Andrew Koppelman. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science,
Northwestern University. Thanks to Bob Bennett, Kent Greenawalt, Samuel Levine,
Martha Nussbaum, Stephen Presser, Steven D. Smith, and audiences at the Law and
Religion section of the Association of American Law Schools' annual meeting and the
DePaul University College of Law faculty workshop for comments, and to Marcia Lehr
for characteristically superb research assistance.
1 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
2 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
3 Id. at 450.
4 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per
curiam)).
5 Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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of a trust, the courts would resolve those issues. 6 Most notably, prop-
erty contributed to a religious body by a member would bear an
implied trust in favor of the fundamental doctrines of that religious
body, and in a dispute would be awarded to the group most faithful to
those doctrines. 7 The Supreme Court has repudiated that approach.
So the Court gives more deference to the decisions of church tribu-
nals than it would give to similarly situated secular bodies.8
This doctrine has elicited objections:
(1) The rule is incoherent as applied to actual practice, since gov-
ernment in fact constantly makes religious judgments, notably when
deciding who is entitled to a religious accommodation, or who the
relevant religious tribunal is.9 The rule is even self-contradictory,
because it requires courts to decide which controversies are religious
and thus beyond the state's cognizance. Because the rule can't be
applied consistently, it in fact is applied inconsistently and
arbitrarily.10
(2) "In reality, virtually every action taken by government at least
tacitly teaches, if not the truth, then the falsity of some religious
beliefs."'I Thus, for example, teaching Darwin in the public schools
implicitly contradicts the views of biblical literalists and creationists.
Even the laws against murder contradict the religious beliefs of
Aztecs. 12
6 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1232-33 (2d
ed. 1988).
7 Id. § 14-11, at 1233.
8 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-12 (1976);
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 445-49.
9 See TRIBE, supra note 6, § 14-11, at 1241-42.
10 SeeJared A. Goldstein, Is There a "Religious Question" Doctrine? Judicial Authority
to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 525-33 (2005). A
similar concern underlies Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off
Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FoRlHAM URB. L.J. 85 (1997).
The rule, Levine argues, distorts the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, lead-
ing some judges to withhold free exercise protection because granting it would
require interpretation of religious beliefs. See id. at 92-123. It also distorts the inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause, either precluding government from engaging
in valuable secular activities with a minor religious element or deferring excessively to
a disingenuous claim of secularity, and thus allowing the government improperly to
endorse and promote religion. See id. at 123-33.
11 Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KErNT L. REV. 625, 657 (2003).
The same point is stressed in REx AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 151-53 (2005), and in Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and
the State's Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1645, 1670-82
(2004).
12 See Smith, supra note 11, at 657.
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(3) Sometimes the state has a legitimate need to explicitly con-
tradict, and attempt to change, the religious beliefs of some people.' 3
Thus, for example, many American political leaders have noted the
importance of encouraging the "ascendancy of a ... version of Islam
that is ... friendly to pluralism, [free] markets, and secularism."'14
To evaluate these claims, we must consider why the challenged
rule exists-why it is regarded as appropriate for government to keep
its hands off religious doctrine. The government should be neutral
with respect to religious doctrine just insofar as neutrality is entailed
by these reasons.
Government neutrality toward religion is based on familiar con-
siderations: the importance of avoiding religious conflict, alienation
of religious minorities, and the danger that religious considerations
will introduce a dangerous, irrational dogmatism into politics and
make democratic compromise more difficult.' 5
Here I want to emphasize one consideration that is often over-
looked: the idea that religion can be damaged and degraded by state
involvement with it. The neglect is apparent, for example, in Freder-
ick Gedicks' (in many ways excellent and insightful) analysis of the
Supreme Court's treatment of religion. Gedicks thinks that the Court
is nominally committed to principles of secular individualism, which
are suspicious of and hostile toward religion, 16 while much of the
country is devoted to a very different ethic, "religious communitarian-
ism," which permits the community to define itself and its goals in
expressly religious terms, and which exerts a gravitational pressure of
its own on constitutional interpretation.' 7 Contemporary doctrine,
Gedicks thinks, is an incoherent congeries of these incompatible ele-
ments.'8 His work articulates widely shared assumptions about the
13 See Garnett, supra note 11, at 1677-82. Another objection is less substantial:
(4) The rule disables courts from rejecting claims of questionable religious signifi-
cance, because they are not permitted to decide whether the claims are reasonable
inferences from religious premises. See Levine, supra note 10, at 92-122. Objection
(4) makes sense only if heretical religious beliefs are not really religious, a dubious
premise that might wipe out all religious claims, since most of the major religions
began as heresies within already extant traditions. For example, if in order to be
religious, a claim must "represent[ ] the view of an organized group," id. at 110, then
Martin Luther was not making a religious claim when he announced his ninety-five
theses.
14 Garnett, supra note 11, at 1680.
15 See, e.g., AHr-AR & LEIGH, supra note 11, at 138-51.
16 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Rhetoric of Church and State 25-43 (1995).
17 Id. at 10-13.
18 Id. at 1-6.
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character of contemporary controversies.1 9 However, he omits an
important middle view, one that is friendly to religion but, precisely
for that reason, is determined to keep the state away from religion. It
is associated with the most prominent early proponents of toleration
and disestablishment. 20
The omission of this view makes the controversy over the mean-
ing of the Establishment Clause 2 1 more polarizing than it needs to be.
If any interpretive question simply turns on a choice between secular
individualism and religious communitarianism, then in any Establish-
ment Clause controversy, the state is taking sides between the forces of
progressivism and religious traditionalism-in other words, it is adju-
dicating the bitterest issues of theological controversy that divide
American religion 22 and thus doing precisely what the hands-off rule
seeks to disable the state from doing. There is no middle ground
between the two views, and compromise is impossible.
The degradation argument is important, because it offers a way to
reframe the rhetoric of the Establishment Clause in a way that could
moderate these tensions and make it possible to find common
ground. The stakes are high.
If the religion-protective argument for disestablishment is to be
useful today, however, it cannot be adopted in the form in which it
was understood in the 17th and 18th centuries, because in that form it
is loaded with assumptions rooted in a particular variety of Protestant
Christianity. Nonetheless, suitably revised, it provides a powerful rea-
son for government, as a general matter, to keep its hands off relig-
ious doctrine.
Part I of this Essay examines the way in which the Supreme Court
has deployed the degradation argument and further explores the way
in which the corruption argument depends on a claim that religion is,
in some way, a good thing. Part II describes the classic formulations
of the claim by the founding generation, with special attention to the
way James Madison synthesized the very different religious views of the
coalition against the Anglican establishment that he built in Virginia.
Part III proposes a revision of the idea of corruption that separates it
19 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 6-9 (2005), draws a similar contrast, between
the legal views of "legal secularists" and "values evangelicals." His omission of relig-
iously based separatism from his diagnosis is noted in DARRYL HART, A SECULAR FAITH
14-16 (2006), and Perry Dane, Separation Anxiety, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 545, 566-70
(2007) (book review).
20 See infra Part II.
21 U.S. CONT. amend. I.
22 SeeJAMES DAViSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARs 42-48 (1991); ROBERT WUTHNOW,
THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 218-22 (1988).
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from its Protestant roots. Part IV responds to objections to the hands-
off rule.
I. THE PARADOX OF "CORRUPTION"
Federal law and the law of every state sometimes grant exemp-
tions from laws, laws that presumably serve some valid purpose, when
the laws place a burden on the free exercise of religion.23 The accom-
modation of religion gives rise to a puzzle in First Amendment theory:
how to reconcile free exercise with establishment principles. The
Court has declared that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one relig-
ion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."24 The
Establishment Clause "mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."25 But
the Court has also acknowledged that "the Free Exercise
Clause, ... by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of
religion."26 It is not logically possible for the government both to be
neutral between religion and nonreligion and to give religion special
protection. Some Justices and many commentators have therefore
23 For a survey of statutes and court decisions adopting the rule, see Douglas
Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the
Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. Rrv. 155, 211-12 & nn.368-73 (2004).
For a survey of situations in which the rule is applied, see 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIG-
ION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
24 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
25 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
26 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981); see also Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n one important respect, the
Constitution is not neutral on the subject of religion: Under the Free Exercise Clause,
religiously motivated claims of conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that
other strongly held beliefs do not.").
The privileged status of religion is somewhat diminished after Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that there is no right to religious exemp-
tions from laws of general applicability. Id. at 878-79. Even after Smith, however,
religions retain some special protection that nonreligious beliefs do not share. In
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court
struck down four ordinances that a city had enacted with the avowed purpose of
preventing a Santeria church from practicing animal sacrifice. See id. at 526-28,
546-47. The laws, the Court held, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment because their object was the suppression of a religious practice. Id. at
542, 547. The result would have been different if the law had targeted a club that did
exactly what the Santeria did, not as part of a religious ritual, but because its members
thought that killing animals was fun.
20091
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regarded the First Amendment as in tension with itself.27 Call this the
free exercise/establishment dilemma.
The solution to the dilemma, I have argued in earlier writings, is
that the government is permitted to treat religion as a valuable thing,
but only if "religion" is understood at such a high level of abstraction
that the state is forbidden from endorsing any theological proposi-
tion, even the existence of God.28 Accommodation is permissible so
long as government does not discriminate, in its accommodations,
between theistic and nontheistic religions. I will discuss this argument
in more detail in Part III. This Essay will argue that the classic justifi-
cation for the hands-off rule is further evidence that my account is
correct.
The corruption argument, I have already noted, rests on a core
assumption that religion is valuable and that neutrality exists in order
to protect it. This is apparent in the Court's most extensive statement
of the corruption argument. In a decision invalidating a state's impo-
sition of a nonsectarian, state-composed prayer to be read in public
schools, the Court explained:
[The] first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment
Clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and relig-
ion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. The his-
tory of governmentally established religion, both in England and in
this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself
with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been
that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of
those who held contrary beliefs. That same history showed that
many people had lost their respect for any religion that had relied
upon the support of government to spread its faith. The Establish-
ment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of
the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too
27 As the Court put it recently, "the two Clauses... often exert conflicting pres-
sures." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
28 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60
MD. L. REV. 713, 726-40 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, Akhil Amar and the Establishment
Clause, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 393, 398-404 (1999); Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give
Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 583-603; Andrew Koppelman, No
Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 729,
734-36 (2003) [hereinafter Koppelman, Religious Orthodoxy]; Andrew Koppelman, On
the Moral Foundations of Legal Expressivism, 60 MD. L. REV. 777, 779-84 (2001); Andrew
Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 125-39 (2002) [hereinafter Koppel-
man, Secular Purpose].
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sacred, too holy, to permit its "unhallowed perversion" by a civil
magistrate. 29
The Court makes two arguments here. The first is a contingent
sociological claim, that establishment tends to produce negative atti-
tudes toward the "particular form" of religion that is established. The
second runs much deeper. In the final sentence, the Court claims
that there is something fundamentally impious about establishment.
It breaches the "sacred" and the "holy." It is remarkable to find such
prophetic language in the U.S. Reports.
The most prominent contemporary proponent of this view is Jus-
tice David Souter. In three dissenting opinions, two of which were
signed by one vote short of a majority of the Justices, he has invoked
the degradation argument as a reason for maintaining a strict rule
that the state may not provide aid to religion in any form, even in a
neutral program that does not aid religion as such. 30
The Court's use of the corruption argument is further evidence
that our law treats religion as a good thing. Any notion of "degrada-
tion" or "perversion" implies a norm or ideal state from which the
degradation or perversion is a falling off.31 A claim that "we ought not
to do A, because that is bad for B," implies that (1) B is a good thing,
and that (2) we can tell what is good and what is bad for B. Thus, the
29 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 2
THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 183, 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)). The Court's
opinion evidently reflected the deeply felt religious beliefs of its author, Hugo Black.
See Dane, supra note 19, at 568-70. According to one account, when Black delivered
the judgment of the Court, his "'voice trembled with emotion ... as he paused over
"too personal, too sacred, too holy."' . . . And he added extemporaneously, 'The
prayer of each man from his soul must be his and his alone."' ROGER K. NEWMAN,
HUGO BLACK 523 (2d ed. 1997) (quotingJAMEs E. CLAYION, THE MAKING OFJUSTICE
21 (1964); DAVID L. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 40-41 (1968)).
30 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the Establishment Clause aims "to save religion from its own cor-
ruption," and that "the specific threat is to the primacy of the schools' mission to
educate the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of their
faith"); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting
that "government aid corrupts religion"); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 891 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Establishment
Clause ... was meant not only to protect individuals and their republics from the
destructive consequences of mixing government and religion, but to protect religion
from a corrupting dependence on support from the Government.").
31 Vincent Blasi has noted that ideas of corruption or distortion of religion "are
meaningless in the absence of a baseline." Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious
Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 783, 798 (2002).
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Court's claim presents, in a different form than accommodation, the
same problem: it presupposes that religion is a good thing, and that
we can tell what is good and what is bad for religion.
These claims made perfect sense at the time of the Founding.
They played a large role in the movement toward disestablishment.
But they depend on contestable theological claims, of just the kind
that the hands-off rule disqualifies government from making.
II. THE CLASSICAL CORRUPTION ARGUMENTS
A. The Varieties of Corruption
The claim's basis is at least as ancient as Jesus Christ's insistence
on distinguishing the things that are Caesar's from the things that are
God's.3 2 It was pervasive during the period of the Founding. But the
specifically Protestant argument for separation had been around for
more than a century. 33
John Milton thought that state support likewise elevates the civil
power over God, subjecting the church to the "political drifts or con-
ceived opinions ' 34 of the civil ruler, and thus "upon her whose only
head is in heaven, yea, upon him who is her only head, sets another in
effect, and, which is most monstrous, a human on a heavenly, a carnal
on a spiritual, a political head on an ecclesiastical body."35 Roger Wil-
liams wrote that to subject religion to temporal power was thus "to
pull God and Christ, and Spirit out of Heaven, and subject them unto
naturall, sinfull, inconstant men, and so consequently to Sathan him-
selfe, by whom all peoples naturally are guided."3 6 John Locke argued
that because "no Man can, if he would, conform his Faith to the Dic-
32 See Luke 20:25; Mark 12:17; Matthew 22:21. Other early Christian formulations
of the separation claim are briefly described in John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of
Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869, 1876-86 (2003) (reviewing DANIEL L. DREISBACH,
THOMASJEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002)
and PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002)), and HAMBURGER,
supra, at 21-38 (2002). For earlier English and American Protestant formulations,
see THOMAS G. SANDERS, PROTESTANT CONCEPTS OF CHURCH AND STATE 184-202
(1964).
33 For examples, see THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 130, 144, 156, 167-68
(1986); HAMBURGER, supra note 32, at 5 n.7, 55, 74-75, 121-22, 124, 170-71; LEONARD
W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 64-67, 124 (1986).
34 JOHN MILTON, CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING THE LIKELIEST MEANS TO REMOVE
HIRELINGS OUT OF THE CHURCH (1659), reprinted in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR
PROSE 856, 872 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957).
35 Id.
36 ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION (1644), reprinted in 3
THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 29, 250 (Samuel L. Caldwell ed., 1963).
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tates of another, ' 37 all that state coercion could produce would be
"Hypocrisie, and Contempt of his Divine Majesty."3 8
Elisha Williams was particularly clear about the religious basis for
his argument that establishment was corrupting to religion:
That the sacred scriptures are the alone rule of faith and prac-
tice to a Christian, all Protestants are agreed in; and must therefore
inviolably maintain, that every Christian has a right of judging for
himself what he is to believe and practice in religion according to
that rule ....
... Every one is under an indispensable obligation to search
the scripture for himself (which contains the whole of it) and to
make the best use of it he can for his own information in the will of
GOD, the nature and duties of Christianity. And as every Christian is
so bound; so he has an unalienable right to judge of the sense and
meaning of it, and to follow his judgment wherever it leads him;
even an equal right with any rulers be they civil or ecclesiastical....
That faith and practice which depends on the judgment and choice
of any other person, and not on the person's own understanding
judgment and choice, may pass for religion in the synagogue of
Satan, whose tenet is that ignorance is the mother of devotion; but
with no understanding Protestant will it pass for any religion at all.
3 9
The minister Isaac Backus, who wrote "the most complete and
well-rounded exposition of the Baptist principles of church and state
in the eighteenth century,"' 40 was centrally concerned about corrup-
tion: " [B] ringing in an earthly power between Christ and his people
has been the grand source of anti-christian abominations .... 41
Thomas Jefferson, the quintessential rational Enlightenment pro-
ponent of separation, declared in his 1777 A Billfor Establishing Relig-
ious Freedom that "Almighty God hath created the mind free," and
from this he inferred that
all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or burthens,
or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
37 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 26 (James H. Tully ed.,
Machett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1689).
38 Id. at 27.
39 ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (1744),
reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 51,
55, 61, 62 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed. 1998).
40 William G. McLoughlin, Introduction to ISAAc BACKUS, ISAAC BACKUS ON
CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM 5, 41-42 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968).
41 ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1733),
reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 40, at 309,
334 (emphasis omitted).
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meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy author of
our religion, who being lord both of body and mind, yet chose not
to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power
to do .... 42
He also noted the state's incompetence:
[T] he impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as
ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired
men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up
their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and
infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others, hath
established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of
the world and through all time . . .4
He specifically invoked corruption: establishment "tends also to cor-
rupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to encourage, by
bribing, with a monopoly of worldly honours and emoluments, those
who will externally profess and conform to it."4 4
He repeated these arguments a few years later in his Notes on the
State of Virginia.45 He explained that religious dissent in Virginia had
been fostered by establishment: "[T] he great care of the government
to support their own church, having begotten an equal degree of
indolence in its clergy, two-thirds of the people had become dissenters
at the commencement of the present revolution. '4 6 Establishment
was a violation of natural right. "[O]ur rulers can have authority over
such natural rights only as we have submitted to them. The rights of
conscience we never submitted, we could not submit. We are answera-
ble for them to our God. '4 7 The effect of religious coercion has been
"[t]o make one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites. 4 8
When Jefferson made these claims, he did not elaborate on his
idea of corruption, but it was quite distinct from that of many of his
fellow citizens. He was a deist who regarded any religious mystery as a
foolish superstition.49 He was an admirer of Joseph Priestley's A His-
42 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THOMAS JEFFFER-
SON: WRITINGS 346, 346 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). Jefferson reported drafting
the bill in 1777; it was enacted, with some deletions, in 1786. THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS, supra, at 1554 hist. n.346.2.
43 JEFFERSON, supra note 42, at 346.
44 Id. at 347.
45 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787), reprinted in
THOMASJEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 42, at 123.
46 Id. at 283.
47 Id. at 285.
48 Id. at 286.
49 See DAVID L. HOLMES, THE FAITHS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 79-89 (2006).
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tory of the Corruptions of Christianity,50 which denounced such core
Christian doctrines as the resurrection and the Trinity.51 While he
was President, he prepared a new, corrected version of the Bible,
using scissors and a razor to excise from the New Testament any claim
of the divinity ofJesus.5 2 The corruption of Christianity consisted pre-
cisely in its capture by institutions that sought state largesse:
My opinion is that there would never have been an infidel, if there
had never been a priest. The artificial structure they have built on
the purest of all moral systems, for the purpose of deriving from it
pence and power, revolt those who think for themselves, and who
read in that system only what is really there. 53
Jefferson's invocation of the corruption argument worked politically
because it appealed not only to rationalists like himself, but also to
intensely religious Christians, preeminently the Baptists.
One of Jefferson's most loyal allies was the Baptist minister John
Leland. 54 Leland strongly opposed any involvement of the state in
religious matters. He was an important source of the pressure to
promise an amendment banning establishment in exchange for the
ratification of the Constitution. 55 There are even unconfirmed stories
indicating that, had Madison not promised Leland to work for such
an amendment, Leland would have derailed the Constitution by
blocking ratification in Virginia.5 6
Leland, like the other writers we have examined, took religious
voluntarism as a basic premise:
Every man must give an account of himself to God, and there-
fore every man ought to be at liberty to serve God in that way that
he can best reconcile it to his conscience. If government can
50 JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE CORRUPTIONS OF CHRISTIANITY (London,
The British & Foreign Unitarian Ass'n 1871) (1782).
51 See id. at 1-51. Jefferson wrote to Adams that he had read the book " 'over and
over again.'" HOLMES, supra note 49, at 82 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
John Adams (Aug. 22, 1813)). He "recommended it for students at the University of
Virginia as the work most likely to wean them from sectarian narrowness." SIDNEY E.
MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT 48 (1963).
52 SeeJARosLAv PELIKAN, JESUS THROUGH THE CENTURIES 189-93 (1985).
53 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. Samuel H. Smith (Aug. 6, 1816), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 42, at 1404.
54 See HAMBURGER, supra note 32, at 156-57.
55 See L.H. Butterfield, Elder John Leland, Jeffersonian Itinerant, 62 PROC. AM. ANTI-
QUARIAN Soc'Y 155, 183-96 (1952).
56 Id.
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answer for individuals at the day ofjudgment, let men be controled
by it in religious matters; otherwise let men be free. 57
The state was an unreliable source of religious guidance:
It is error, and error alone, that needs human support; and when-
ever men fly to the law or sword to protect their system of religion,
and force it upon others, it is evident that they have something in
their system that will not bear the light, and stand upon the basis of
truth. 58
Even if nonconformity is tolerated, but certain beliefs favored, "the
minds of men are biassed to embrace that religion which is favored
and pampered by law (and thereby hypocrisy is nourished) while
those who cannot stretch their consciences to believe any thing and
every thing in the established creed are treated with contempt and
opprobrious names."59 The state should not have any power to pro-
vide for ministers, enact Sabbath laws, pay military chaplains, or have
any religious qualifications for office. 60 He opposed a proposal to end
delivery of the mail on Sundays. 6 1
Leland opposed Sunday schools, theological seminaries, and mis-
sionary societies, because their "natural tendency" was "to reduce the
gospel to school divinity, and represent the work of the Holy Unction
in the heart, to be no more than what men can perform for them-
selves and for others; and also to fill the ministerial ranks with
pharasaical hypocrites."62 Even communion was of doubtful value,
because after "more than thirty years experiment, I have had no evi-
dence that the bread and wine ever assisted my faith to discern the
Lord's body. I have never felt guilty for not communing, but often for
doing it."63
A common strand in all of these arguments is religious individual-
ism-the view that religious truth was a matter between the individual
and God. Thomas Sanders observes that Leland brought the individu-
57 JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (New-London 1791),
reprinted in 2 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, supra note 39, at
1079, 1085.
58 Butterfield, supra note 55, at 199 (quoting LELAND, supra note 57, at 1089).
59 LELAND, supra note 57, at 1087.
60 CuRRY, supra note 33, at 176.
61 Letter from Elder John Leland to Col. R.M. Johnson (Jan. 8, 1830), in THE
WRITINGS OFJOHN LELAND 561, 561-63 (photo. reprint 1969) (L.F. Greene ed., 1845);
2 WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1883, at 932 (1971).
62 Butterfield, supra note 55, at 235 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Letter from
ElderJohn Leland to S. Trott (Sept. 7, 1832)).
63 Id. at 206 (quoting Letter from Elder John Leland to the Shaftsbury Ass'n
(Aug. 23, 1811), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OFJOHN LELAND, supra note 61, at 59-60).
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alism of the Enlightenment into religion by abandoning the Puritan
conception of a community governed, collectively, by God's law. "The
form, nature, and significance of the church receded behind a preoc-
cupation with the conversion of single souls, and the church repre-
sented no more than a voluntary compact of individuals. ' 64 This
assumption was pervasive at the time of the Founding. In the late
eighteenth century, Mark Noll observes, most Americans
shared both a mistrust of intellectual authorities inherited from pre-
vious generations and a belief that true knowledge arose from the
use of one's own senses-whether the external senses for informa-
tion about nature and society or the moral sense for ethical and
aesthetic judgments. Most Americans were thus united in the con-
viction that people had to think for themselves in order to know
science, morality, economics, politics, and especially theology.6 5
A state-sponsored orthodoxy was as counterproductive in theology as
it would be in any of these other fields. Salvation was a matter for the
individual. "'My best judgment tells me that my neighbor does
wrong,"' Leland wrote, "'but guilt is not transferable. Every one must
give an account of himself.' " 66
Yet despite his alliance with Jefferson, Leland was no rationalist.
He preached "'the great doctrines of universal depravity, redemption
by the blood of Christ, regeneration, faith, repentance and self-
denial.'" 6 7 He once heard the voice of God speaking to him. One
night, some devilish ghost approached his bed, groaning so horribly
that Leland hid under the bedclothes and prayed to God for help. 68
He said, "'I know myself to be a feeble, sinful worm.' ,,69 Yet he was
indifferent to most theological controversies. 70 Feeling mattered to
him more than doctrine. 71 He made Jeffersonian political philosophy
64 SANDERS, supra note 32, at 215.
65 MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S GOD 11 (2002).
66 Butterfield, supra note 55, at 239 (quoting JOHN LELAND, TRANSPORTATION OF
THE MAIL (1830), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF JOHN LELAND, supra note 61, at 564,
565).
67 McLoUGHLIN, supra note 61, at 931 (quoting JOHN LELAND, THE VIRGINIA
CHRONICLE (1790), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OFJOHN LELAND, supra note 61, at 92,
108).
68 Id.
69 Id. (quoting LELAND, supra note 67, at 173).
70 See Butterfield, supra note 55, at 158.
71 At Baptist revivals, he wrote:
Such a heavenly confusion among the preachers, and such a celestial discord
among the people, destroy all articulation, so that the understanding is not
edified; but the awful echo, sounding in the ears, and the objects in great
distress, and great raptures before the eyes, raise great emotion in the heart.
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appealing to his poor, ignorant, and enthusiastic followers, and thus
"succeeded in linking the political philosophy of the American
enlightenment with the camp-meeting spirit."72
B. Madison's Synthesis
The deism of Jefferson and the radical Protestantism of Leland
were brilliantly synthesized by Madison in the Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments,73 the classic description of the
pathologies that the founding generation associated with establish-
ment. Madison, of course, is the one who actually led the movement
for disestablishment, first leading the fight in Virginia, then as princi-
pal author of the First Amendment. 74
Madison's argument was offered against a bill that would have
allowed all Christian churches to receive tax money, and would have
permitted each taxpayer to designate the church to receive his tax.75
If the taxpayer refused to designate a church, the funds would go to
schools. 76 Even this nonpreferential aid, Madison thought, tended to
corrupt religion.
The Memorial and Remonstrance begins with a theological claim: "It
is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and
such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is prece-
dent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of
Civil Society. ' 77 Madison further argued that the idea "that the Civil
Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth" is "an arrogant
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all
ages."78 The idea that religion should be promoted because it con-
duces to good citizenship, an idea that we often hear even today,
Madison denounced as an attempt to "employ Religion as an engine
of Civil policy," which he thought "an unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation. '79 Moreover,
Id. at 170 (quoting LELAND, supra note 67, at 115).
72 Id. at 242.
73 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785),
in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 6 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
74 See DANIEL L. DREISBACH ET AL., THE FOUNDERS ON GOD AND GOVERNMENT 251
(2004).
75 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (Dec. 24,
1784), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (contained in the supplemental appendix to justice Rutledge's dissent).
76 Id. at 74.
77 Madison, supra note 73, at 7.
78 Id. at 9.
79 Id.
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experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary
operation. During almost fifteen centuries has the legal establish-
ment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More
or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance
and servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution.
80
Madison was reticent about his own religious beliefs, which were
probably some variant of deism,"' but the Memorial and Remonstrance is
nonetheless the most useful source of antiestablishment thinking. It
was a public document, not a private statement of Madison's views. It
presented a synthesis of the antiestablishment views that prevailed in
his time, combining religious arguments designed to appeal to Evan-
gelical Christians and secular arguments designed to appeal to
Enlightenment Lockeans. 82 It is unlikely that these groups agreed on
anything more than the propositions stated by Madison himself. But
they did agree about them.
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance states a set of pathologies
that are to be avoided, which can be regarded as pathologies from a
variety of different points of view. Different members of his coalition
had different ideas about why these were pathologies. Madison was
carefully noncommittal about which of them was right.
The Establishment Clause, then, is based on a convergence of
views held by people with radically differing religious views, who none-
theless converged on the idea that religion could be damaged by state
involvement.
80 Id. at 9-10.
81 See HOLMES, supra note 49, at 91-98. For some evidence that Madison was, at
least early in his life, sincere in holding the religious views stated in the Memorial and
Remonstrance, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LusTRE OF OUR COUNTRY 64-91 (1998).
The specific claims about corruption in the Memorial and Remonstrance are also made
in his private correspondence, both early and late in his life. See Letter from James
Madison to William Bradford,Jr. (Jan. 24, 1774), in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra
note 73, at 2, 2-5; Letter from James Madison to Thomas R. Dew (Feb. 23, 1833), in
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 73, at 338, 341.
82 On the variety of religious positions to which Madison was appealing, see
THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787, at
130-36 (1977), and JOHN WITrE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 21-35 (2d ed. 2005). Vincent Phillip Mufioz observes that "Madison
leaves it unclear whether the 'Memorial's' argument is theological, strictly rational, or
both." Vincent Phillip Mufioz, James Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty, 97 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 17, 22 n.13 (2003).
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III. CORRUPTION TODAY
Is there a way of understanding the corruption argument that
does not itself paradoxically violate the Establishment Clause by
depending on a particular vision of uncorrupted religion?
Madison solved the problem by offering an account of uncor-
rupted religion that was sufficiently vague to win the assent of people
with widely varying religious views. That kind of solution remains
promising.
Religion is a category that is hard to delimit.8 3 The best treat-
ments of the problem of defining "religion" for constitutional pur-
poses, most prominently that of Kent Greenawalt, have concluded0
that no dictionary definition will do, because no single feature unites
all the things that are indisputably religions. Religions just have a
"family resemblance" to one another. In doubtful cases, one can only
ask how close the analogy is between a putative instance of religion
and the indisputable instances.84
This process need not yield indeterminacy. The concept of "fam-
ily resemblance" is drawn from the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, who famously argued that "the meaning of a word is its use in
the language."8 5 Thus, for example, there is no single thing common
to "games" which makes them all games but "similarities, relation-
ships, and a whole series of them at that."8 6 The use of the word
"game" is thus not circumscribed by any clear rule. But that does not
mean that it is not circumscribed at all. "[N]o more are there any
83 See 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 124-56; see also William P. Alston, Religion,
in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 366, 368 (Donald M. Borchert ed., 2d ed. 2006)
("If it is true that the religion-making characteristics neither singly nor in combina-
tion constitute tight necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a relig-
ion, and yet that each of them contributes to making something a religion, then it
must be that they are related in some looser way to the application of the term.");
George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Relig-
ion, " 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1565 (1983) ("There is simply no essence of religion, no
single feature or set of features that all religions have in common and that distin-
guishes religion from everything else. There is only a focus, coupled with a set of
paradigmatic features."); Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE
L.J. 791, 814-21 (1997) (developing a methodology for determining whether a belief
system is a religion to help judges remain "sensitive to the deep flexibility and nuance
involved in the meaning ... of the word 'religion"'). Courts in Europe have done no
better in devising a definition. AHDAR & LEIGH, supra note 11, at 110-26.
84 Kent Greenawalt, Religion As a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753
(1984).
85 LUDWIG WlrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 20 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1968).
86 Id. at 31.
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rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet
tennis is a game for all that and has rules too."8 7
Explaining Wittgenstein's idea here, Charles Taylor observes that,
with respect to a great many rule-guided social practices,
the "rule" lies essentially in the practice. The rule is what is animat-
ing the practice at any given time, and not some formulation
behind it, inscribed in our thoughts or our brains or our genes, or
whatever. That's why the rule is, at any given time, what the prac-
tice has made it.88
The rules of appropriate comportment when riding on a bus, for
instance, are not codified anywhere. But natives of the culture may
understand quite well what they are, and there may be no doubt at all
as to how they apply in particular cases, even if they have not been
codified and could not be codified. 9
The definition of religion in American law appears to work just
this way. There is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that
will make something a "religion." But it is remarkable how few cases
have arisen in which courts have had real difficulty in determining
whether or not something is a religion.9 0
In the context of the hands-off rule, religion should be under-
stood by reference to a set of ultimate questions that the state must
not try to answer. But the state can recognize and promote the good
of religion, understood at a certain level of abstraction. Neutrality is
fluid; it is available in many specifications.9 1 The American approach
is one defensible specification. The state is agnostic about religion,
but it is an interested and sympathetic agnosticism. The state does not
say, "I don't know and you don't either." Rather it declares the value
of religion in a carefully noncommittal way: "It would be good to find
out. And we encourage your efforts to do that."
The precise character of the good being promoted is itself delib-
erately left vague, because the broad consensus on freedom of relig-
87 Id. at 33.
88 CHARLES TAYLOR, To Follow a Rule, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 165, 178
(1995).
89 See "WEIRD AL" YANKO-vC, Another One Rides the Bus, on ANOTHER ONE RIDES THE
Bus (Placebo Records 1981).
90 The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of "religion"
is a remarkably short one. See Religion, 36C WEST'S WORDS AND PHRASES 153-57 (West
2002 & Supp. 2008). A recent survey laments the absence of a clear definition, but
offers no evidence that the courts have had any trouble deciding cases as a result.
Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional "Religion". A Survey of First Amendment Defini-
tions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 122-25 (2001).
91 See Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REv. POL. 633 (2004).
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ion would surely collapse if we had to state with specificity the value
promoted by religion. "Religion" denotes a cluster of goods, includ-
ing salvation (if you think you need to be saved), harmony with the
transcendent origin of universal order (if it exists), 92 responding to
the fundamentally imperfect character of human life (if it is imper-
fect),93 courage in the face of the heartbreaking aspects of human
existence (if that kind of encouragement helps),9 4 a transcendent
underpinning for the resolution to act morally (if that kind of under-
pinning helps), 95 contact with that which is awesome and indescrib-
able (if awe is something you feel), 96 and many others. No general
description of the good that religion seeks to promote can be satisfac-
tory, politically or intellectually. 97 The Establishment Clause permits
the state to favor religion so long as "religion" is understood very
broadly, forbidding any discrimination or preference among religions
or religious propositions.
This understanding makes it possible to defend accommodations
without running into the free exercise/establishment dilemma. The
state is recognizing the value of religion, but it is making no claims
about religious truth. It is the making of such claims that violates the
Establishment Clause.
This understanding also provides a basis for the hands-off rule.
Each of these understandings of the good of religion is manipulable
for political purposes. Each is likely to be abused. There is no reason
to trust the state to resolve religious questions. The incompetence
and futility extend to the deepest religious divisions today.
92 SeeJOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 89-90 (1980).
93 See KEITH E. YANDELL, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 17-34 (1999).
94 See PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE 139-54 (2d ed. 2000).
95 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 127-28 (Thomas
Kingsmill Abbot trans., Forgotten Books 2008) (1788); IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION
WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 48 (Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson
trans., Harper & Row, 1960) (1794).
96 See RUDOLF OTro, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY 31-40 (John W. Harvey trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1950).
97 Charles Taylor has stated the difficulties for any general theory of religion:
I doubt very much whether any such general theory can even be established.
I mean a theory which can gather all the powerful lans and aspirations
which humans have manifested in the spiritual realm, and relate them to
some single set of underlying needs or aims or tendencies (whether it be the
desire for meaning or something else). The phenomena are much too
varied and baffling for that; and even if they were more tractable, we would
have to stand at the end of history to be able to draw such conclusions.
CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 679 (2007).
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IV. THE OBJECTIONS ANSWERED
So what can be said about the objections to the hands-off rule
that we considered at the beginning?
The hands-off rule, I will now suggest, is an application of the
corruption rationale. The state is to keep its hands off religion pre-
cisely for the sake of religion, because religion will be damaged by
contact with the state.
With respect to the first objection, Goldstein and Levine are right
that the state has to scrutinize religion at least in order to decide what
is religious. 98 The corruption objection presupposes this. Corruption
is a danger if any specific conception of religion is sponsored by the
state-for example, if the Court relied on Protestant premises to inter-
pret the Establishment Clause, in the manner of Elisha Williams. But
it does not arise out of the religious rationale for the hands-off rule as
I have reformulated it here, because that rule understands religion so
abstractly that it cannot be identified with the political program of any
party.
The corruption rationale is abused, however, if a court tries to
decide, in any particular case, whether there has been corruption.
Justice Souter, the principal modern proponent of the corrup-
tion rationale, has fallen squarely into this trap. Dissenting in Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris,99 in which the Court upheld a program that allowed
parents to pay religious school tuition with state-funded vouchers, he
cited the risk of corruption described by Madison. 10 0 Then he
declared: "The risk is already being realized."10' 1 He noted the deci-
sions of many religious schools to comply with the Ohio program's
requirements that schools not discriminate on the basis of religion,
nor "teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of
religion."'10
2
Kevin Pybas observes that Justice Souter's argument amounts to
an accusation that the religious have been unfaithful to their God
and to what their God requires of them."'1 3 Pybas is entirely correct
to belabor Justice Souter with the familiar concern about the limits of
state competence:
98 See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
99 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
100 Id. at 711-12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 712.
102 Id. (quoting OHIO RE-,. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(4) (West Supp. 2002)).
103 Kevin Pybas, Does the Establishment Clause Require Religion to Be Confined to the
Private Sphere?, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 71, 102 (2005).
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[H]ow doesJustice Souter know when a particular religious commu-
nity has compromised its principles? Is he or the Court generally so
well-versed in the theologies of the various religious traditions in
this country that he or it is in a position to say to a religious commu-
nity that it has violated its own principles? 10 4
Justice Souter's error shows that, even if the corruption rationale
is accepted, it cannot be operationalized as a requirement that courts
look for corruption in particular cases. It is rather a reason for the
state to avoid making any religious determinations at all. 10 5
Justice Souter offers a more telling objection to the voucher pro-
gram's restrictions when he observes that the ban on teaching
"hatred" itself raises religious questions. This condition, he notes,
"could be understood (or subsequently broadened) to prohibit reli-
gions from teaching traditionally legitimate articles of faith as to the
error, sinfulness, or ignorance of others."10 6 Any such understanding
might violate the hands-off rule for the same reason that it was vio-
lated by the charge of fraud against Edna and Donald Ballard for
claiming that St. Germain had given them extraordinary healing pow-
ers. 10 7 Claiming that the Christian religion is the only path to salva-
tion and that all non-Christians are damned may or may not constitute
"hatred." It is not clear how a state can decide that without getting
into forbidden questions of theology. For example, a religious group
might argue that its claims about the damnation of nonbelievers
reflect loving concern rather than hatred. How could a state respond
to that?
This objection is not fatal to the program, however, since the
"hatred" proviso does not unambiguously require this result. A famil-
iar canon of statutory construction holds that ambiguous laws are not
to be read in a way that renders them unconstitutional.1 0 8 Federal
courts are also not to adjudicate the constitutionality of ambiguous
state laws before the state courts have the opportunity to interpret
them. 10 9 If Ohio were to read its "hatred" proviso in the way Souter
104 Id. at 101-02.
105 The point here is analogous to one that Richard Garnett has made about the
rule, sometimes entertained by the Court, that a law may be unconstitutional because
it has the potential to divide the populace along religious lines. Richard W. Garnett,
Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1710-24 (2006). Garnett
shows that divisiveness cannot provide a workable criterion for constitutionality. See
id. He does not, however, deny that religious division is one of the underlying con-
cerns of the Establishment Clause. See id.
106 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 713 (Souter, J., dissenting).
107 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
108 Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 272 (2003).
109 R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
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suggests, that would raise constitutional difficulties, but since it hasn't
happened yet, it can't be an argument against the law's
constitutionality.
The second and third objections are more radical. The second
objection is that any time the state does anything, it is implicitly
endorsing some religious claims and rejecting others.110 This is cer-
tainly correct. But there is a big difference between explicitly endors-
ing religious claims and doing so only implicitly and nonspecifically.
The homicide laws imply that Aztec cosmology is false, but they
endorse no cosmology in particular. Smith thinks that the distinction
does not matter much, but then he must believe either that the cor-
ruption of religion by official meddling is not a danger or that the
corruption is inevitable.111
The latter possibility, that corruption is unavoidable, is also raised
by Justice Souter's dissent in Zelman.112 It is undoubtedly true that
conditional funding places pressure on religious schools to comply
with the conditions. This may have an effect on the content of the
schools' religious teachings, even if that is not the state's purpose. But
if the state funds public but not religious schools, then this also puts
financial pressure on religious people not to send their children to
religious schools. Pybas observes that this leads Souter's logic to
absurd results: "If the Establishment Clause is intended to prevent
states from placing individuals in a situation in which they will be
tempted to compromise their religious beliefs, as Justice Souter main-
tains, then it would seem that public schooling itself violates the Estab-
lishment Clause." 1 3 Impact alone cannot be corruption, or else the
corruption claim loses all its meaning. In the voucher case, the fact
that the state is not expressly endorsing any religious proposition or
trying to manipulate religion ought to be enough to answer that
claim.
The third objection1 14 challenges Justice Brennan's claim that
when "civil courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] controversies...,
the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of
religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of
110 See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
111 My response to the second objection is developed in detail in Koppelman,
Religious Orthodoxy, supra note 28, at 732-36.
112 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-15 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
113 Pybas, supra note 103, at 96-97.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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purely ecclesiastical concern."115 Garnett objects that there are not
many matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. 116 The content of relig-
ious belief is extremely relevant to matters of governance, and the
state can't be indifferent to what citizens believe.
1 1 7
Garnett insists on this point, yet he doesn't seem to want to draw
any practical conclusions from it.118 He does not propose to change a
single detail of existing Religion Clause jurisprudence. Indeed, he
cites with approval my formulation: "'[G] overnment may not declare
religious truth.'"119 This suggests to me that his problem with Justice
Brennan's formulation is not practical but theoretical: he wants to
know how one can endorse the rule that Justice Brennan announces
without being confused or disingenuous. The interesting question
that Garnett raises is not whether state agnosticism on religious mat-
ters is desirable, but rather whether and how it is possible. Can one
give a coherent account of Justice Brennan's rule? Or is the state not
always, at least implicitly, taking sides in religious disputes?
In short, all of these objections are, in their strongest forms,
directed not at the hands-off rule but at the coherence of its intellec-
tual underpinnings. It is that coherence that I have defended here.
115 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
116 See Garnett, supra note 11, at 1649-50.
117 Id.
118 Garnett's one departure from a hands-off rule is his discussion of American
attempts to encourage the less warlike variants of Islam in the Middle East. See id. at
1680-81. But in this case the nation is facing the kind of supreme emergency that
can override any constitutional constraint. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST
WARS 251-68 (4th ed. 2006). It is also pertinent that the manipulation is taking place
overseas, where the Constitution has always had diminished force, but this is not dis-
positive; a federal program to fund Christian missionaries abroad would certainly be
unconstitutional. The Constitution has something to say about Ann Coulter's propo-
sal, in response to Islamic terrorism, that "[w]e should invade their countries, kill
their leaders and convert them to Christianity." Ann Coulter, This Is War, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/coulter/coulter.shtm.
119 Garnett, supra note 11, at 1658 (quoting Koppelman, Secular Purpose, supra
note 28, at 89).
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